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American political culture, the sense of "subjective competence" is high. People expect to be able to influence collective decisions that affect them, even if they may not choose to exert that influence (Almond and Verba 1963, chap. 7).
An instrumental argument is that effective lay participation in risk decisions makes them more legitimate and leads to better results (e.g., Kraft 1988) . The lay public is unwilling to delegate important decisions to experts and administrative authorities simply because those decisions are technical in basis. If we lack mechanisms for lay participation, then the current crisis of confidence afflicting risk institutions can only deepen. In addition, broader participation may contribute to better decision making, incorporate a broader range of values into decisions, and reduce the probability of error.1
This article presents a preliminary survey of institutional mechanisms allowing citizens to take part in environmental and risk policymaking. It focuses on the normative argument; it thus emphasizes the merits of participation on democratic process grounds. Its purposes are to propose criteria for assessing participatory mechanisms as democratic processes and to review five mechanisms under these criteria. The five mechanisms are public hearings, initiatives, public surveys, negotiated rule making, and citizens review panels. They represent less a comprehensive list than generic types for discussion. This list also omits several commonly used mechanismselite advisory commissions, written comment processes, or site-specific dispute mediation.2 But the five discussed here define a range of institutional alternatives that involve broad (initiatives) as well as narrow (citizens panel) participation; place varying degrees of emphasis on a decision or outcome as opposed to process; and encompass the most common form of administrative participation (public hearings) as well as more innovative or less frequently used ones (negotiated rule making or citizens panels).
The next section defines democratic criteria for assessing participatory mechanisms. Following that is a review and assessment of the five mechanisms selected for discussion here.
Democratic Process Criteria
This article argues that our thinking about participation requires a grounding in contemporary democratic theory. As a framework, I will draw upon what I call the "participation theorists," who argue that new forms of participation are necessary in a world in which people increasingly lack control over social decisions that affect them. Sources of this decline in citizen control include problems of scale, technology, and the concentration of power in national institutions.3
The participation theorists' diagnosis holds special force in environmental risk and other technically based policymaking. Here, they would argue, a scientific and technical elite plays an increasingly influential role in decisions. Resolution of technical disputes is often entrusted to experts, because the lay public cannot grasp the basis for decisions and their consequences. "Expert" perceptions of problems (e.g., the nature of risk and priorities for collective action) are judged to be more rational than the "subjective" perceptions of the less technically sophisticated public. The particular features of environmental risk policymaking thus exaggerate the general causes of decline in citizen control.
As a response to these trends, participation theory proposes to reinvigorate our conception of "citizen" and of the institutions through which citizens take part in collective decisions. It accepts that people are the best judge of their interests and can acquire the political skills needed to take a part in governance. Participation engenders civic competence by building democratic skills, overcoming feelings of powerlessness and alienation, and contributing to the legitimacy of the political system. Evidence of low political awareness and lack of interest in issues are taken as signs of deficiencies in institutions, not as limitations inherent in individuals (Pateman 1970, 105-11) .
Participation theory suggests four criteria for evaluating institutional mechanisms as democratic processes. It is important to view each of these criteria as a continuum, and the assessment of each mechanism as a judgment about its capacity to fulfill the criteria. The first criterion is that a mechanism should allow for the direct participation of amateurs in decisions. At the national level, most participation takes the form of people acting in their capacities as elected representatives, appointed administrators, interest group professionals, or technical experts. Participation theory seeks to involve people in their capacities as amateurs (i.e., citizens) rather than in their professional or career roles.
Second, we can assess mechanisms by the extent to which they enable citizens to share in collective decision making. The ideal in participation theory is to achieve a level of participation that is more than therapeutic, oppositional, or pleading, but in which "citizens share in governing" (Thompson 1970, 3) . This occurs when citizens exercise decision authority or codetermine policies in collaboration with government officials.
A third criterion is the degree to which a mechanism provides a structure for face-to-face discussion over some period of time. Discussion, deliberation, the search for shared values, the opportunity to transform conflict into more constructive directions through mutual talk and persuasion-all are important attributes of a participatory process. With political talk, Barber (1984, 177) asserts, "we can invent alternative futures, create mutual purposes, and construct competing visions of community."
Finally, participation theory would assess a mechanism by the opportunity it offers citizens to participate on some basis of equality with administrative officials and technical experts. Does a process allow citizens to define issues, question technical experts, dispute evidence, and shape the agenda? Are they dealing with administrative officials who can exercise decision authority, or with staff who can only represent those decision makers? Is there adequate opportunity for education and preparation on factual and analytical issues? We cannot expect lay participants to master the technical aspects of hazard assessment or exposure modeling. But there may be ways to design institutions that enable people to participate more effectively and on a basis of greater equality with agency officials.
A Review of Participatory Mechanisms
Public hearings. Hearings define a broad but familiar category of mechanisms. They tend to be loosely structured, open forums, where interested members of the public hear agency proposals and respond, typically in a format determined by the agency. An agency like the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) will convene hundreds of public hearings each year. For many issues, the public hearing is the only institutional form of interaction between the agency and the affected public.
Hearings serve several purposes for the agency. They give at least the appearance of individual and community involvement, legitimate decisions already made, warn the agency of potential political and legal obstacles, satisfy legal or procedural requirements, and defuse the opposition (e.g., The initiative. Initiatives enable citizens to place issues on the ballot for voter approval. In many respects, they are the prototype of democratic process. They emphasize democratic values of equality; all citizens are entitled to participate, and the influence of each on the result is identical. When the result is binding, the outcome determines policy. For many observers, they are the closest equivalent in modern, mass society to the democratic ideal of governance through a face-to-face assembly of citizens. In the United States, which has never held a national referendum, initiatives are found most frequently in western states, especially California, Oregon, Washington, and Colorado (Butler and Ranney 1978; Hahn and Kaminiecki 1987; Lee 1978) . With the passage of Proposition 65 in October 1986, California is the outstanding example of the use of the initiative to establish environmental policies (Haag 1987) .
Empirical studies provide an encouraging but mixed portrait of initiatives. Participation generally parallels that for candidate elections, although the rate is usually slightly lower (Hahn and Kaminiecki 1987, 143) . In a study of statewide initiatives in western states, Price rejects the assertion that initiatives are principally a vehicle for special interests. Research on voter behavior demonstrates that voters are thinking about issues and can cope with the complexities of issues and their presentation. Price (1978, 262) concludes that initiatives can allow for "decisive decisions on particularly sensitive, hard-to-resolve issues."
Two of California's environmental measures were the subject of detailed analysis. The Clean Air Initiative (Proposition 9) failed in June of 1972 with only one-third of the vote, and the Coastal Conservation Initiative (Proposition 20) passed in October of that year with a 55% majority. In both cases, the analysis suggests that (1) most voters were unaware or undecided until the last few weeks before the election and (2) voters initially tended to perceive the measure favorably if it appeared to meet a need or correct a problem, but any doubts would surface or be reinforced in the face of a strong opposition campaign. A response to the defeat of 11 coastal protection bills in the state legislature, the Coastal Initiative "provided an outlet for ecological activism within the system and helped prevent public alienation from the political process" (Lutrin and Settle 1975, 371) .
Critics argue that referenda delegate decision authority to an uninformed or otherwise unqualified electorate, measure the direction but not the intensity of beliefs, and weaken the power of elected authorities, especially legislatures. Even advocates of broad citizen participation express reservations about initiatives. One is that they fail to provide an institutional forum for deliberation and debate. They take a snapshot of public opinion and adopt it as the basis for policy. A second is that a majority vote forces a decision from among dichotomous choices rather than establishing a basis for con-sensus. Others argue that initiatives compare poorly to the legislative process; they cannot reflect differences in the intensity of views or allow for compromise among groups (Wolfinger and Greenstein 1968). Environmental agencies' increasing use of cost-benefit methodology has led to a different application of survey techniques. In a cost-benefit analysis, an agency attaches dollar values to the expected benefits of a regulatory action. For some benefits, there are reasonably clear market referents, such as costs avoided for reductions in morbidity and the damage function approach for physical damage. For others, such as preserving a scenic view or an endangered species, agencies use contingent valuation surveys that ask people about their "willingness to pay for hypothetical levels of environmental quality" (Fisher 1984, 106; Bishop and Heberlein 1987) . Unlike surveys, which directly measure public preferences for consideration by policymakers, contingent valuation studies are a method for converting public responses to hypothetical, often artificially defined situations into dollar values. In addition, contingent valuation is designed more to incorporate public preferences into decision models rather than to complement broader participation programs.
There are several criticisms of surveys as proxies for more direct participation. They isolate problems and issues from their social and community context, which are important influences on judgment. Another criticism is that the design of survey instruments can affect responses, and thus the conclusions drawn about public preferences. Influence over decisions is minimal and indirect, especially in contingent valuation, where any influence people have is translated to conform to a decision model they may not understand or accept. Yet as a source of feedback on public attitudes and a corrective to other participatory mechanisms that incorporate more bias, citizen surveys can be a valuable way of informing policymakers.
Negotiated rule making. A recent innovation in several federal agencies, negotiated rule making is more clearly defined as an institutional mechanism than the hearing or survey, which define generic types (Harter 1982) . Negotiations conducted by EPA and other agencies exhibit three principal characteristics. First, the negotiations complement but do not replace the conventional notice-and-comment rule-making process. Second, the agency participates as a party at interest in the negotiations. It also commits to publishing the negotiating committee's consensus as a proposed rule, so long as it is consistent with the agency's statutory authority. Third, once a negotiating committee is formally constituted, it has substantial control over its mode of operation, composition, use of resources, and the terms and timing of its dissolution. Committees establish their own protocols and are free to define key issues, establish work groups, and assign issues for study and recommendations (Fiorino 1988; Susskind and McMahon 1985) .
Although advocates typically stress its value in avoiding or resolving conflict, negotiated rule making also appears to offer other benefits. Participants generally consider the products of a negotiation to be more informed, pragmatic, and workable than products of a conventional rule making. Parties have access to information as it is needed and the opportunity to educate others and persuade them of the reasons behind their positions. The negotiation format and the presence of senior agency officials permit discussion and debate among policymakers and representatives of industry, state and local, professional, and environmental interests. Because it draws on representatives of organized interests, negotiation does not offer the opportunity for the direct participation of amateurs in risk decisions. For several reasons, it also may be inappropriate for decisions affecting fundamental social values or choices. Within its range, however, negotiation may be valuable as a deliberative process-as a mechanism for citizen participation as well as a means of resolving technical or policy conflict (Fiorino 1988 1984, 48-49 ) considers the lay jury as a model for democratic participation, citing as its advantages access to technical information, the capacity to debate evidence and issues, and insulation from outside pressures.
A mechanism based explicitly on the jury model that has been applied to environmental issues is the citizens review panel (Crosby et al. 1986 ). Participants are selected through stratified random sampling, although representatives of affected interest groups may also take part. A steering committee representing a cross-section of interests determines who will present evidence and arguments. The panel hears testimony, questions technical experts, and deliberates issues. The panel typically will take two or more days to study the problem, discuss issues, and reach a conclusion. In contrast to the more common public hearing, participants have the opportunity to ask questions, challenge experts, and explore issues in some depth. The panels' products could include written recommendations and even meetings with key decision makers as part of the deliberations. Citizens panels differ from the far more common advisory commission because they strive for lay rather than elite or technical participation, and thus reach more broadly for participation and a sense of community values.
The premise of the citizens panel and similar mechanisms is that under the right conditions, representatives of the lay public can acquire the information and understanding to enable them to apply their judgment to technical policy problems. Participants can influence the agenda, question experts, evaluate evidence, balance competing considerations, and debate issues, possibly with authoritative decision makers. Although risk agencies could not delegate decisions to a panel, they could use it as a mechanism for informing their judgment about lay values and concerns. Unlike a survey, a panel can make only limited claims to representativeness, in the sense of representing a cross-section of an affected population; its primary influence will derive from the quality of its deliberations and its recommendations to policymakers. Yet the limitations of the citizens panel are clear. It reaches only a small proportion of the affected public; requires a substantial investment of time and money; and, by raising expectations of possible influence that may not be met, can involve a fair amount of risk for the agency or administrator and of frustration for the participants. How do these participatory mechanisms fare under the democratic process criteria? Table 1 presents a summary. Four of the five permit direct participation by amateurs. The exception is negotiation, where there is participation by representatives of interests. Negotiated rule making relies explicitly on a pluralist model of interest group representation. In the other four, the quality of this direct participation varies. In a hearing, it is participation as a commenter, and in a survey, as a respondent. The initiative and review panel achieve something close to participation as a citizen; participation is not primarily reactive, and there is some recognition that individuals are capable of judging what is in their own interests.
Only in the initiative do citizens exercise full decision authority, although any one person's influence over the result is small. The best example of shared authority is a negotiated rule making, where all of the parties must consent to a decision before it can be said to reflect a consensus. The other three mechanisms offer limited or no opportunity to share authority. A hearing is most likely to have influence when it reveals intense and vocal opposition. As a form of citizen influence, it may be most effective in blocking or forcing reconsideration of decisions that face intense opposition. A citizens review panel can inform policymakers' judgment, based on good information and careful deliberation, but cannot officially share authority for the result. To the extent that participants in a survey affect the result, they are likely to be unaware of it.
Similarly, the survey fares most poorly as a forum for debate and discussion. The citizen is reduced to the role of a respondent who reacts to carefully structured, closed-ended questions in isolation from group influences or opinions. In contrast, even a vote on an initiative is part of a public process that can stimulate a search for information and community debate. The opportunity for discussion and debate is a particular strength of negotiations and review panels. Negotiations engage people in problem solving over time, with substantial opportunity to present information, persuade and be persuaded, and discover common ground or clarify bases of disagreement. The format of a review panel is designed to inform lay participants on complex issues, encourage interaction between experts and nonexperts, and promote group discussion. The hearing offers a forum for some discussion, but it often is superficial and may emphasize conflict over the search for common ground.
In allowing people to participate on some basis of equality with administrative officials and experts, the public hearing and surveys are weakest. In a typical hearing, the agency defines the agenda, establishes the format, and controls the information and the analytical resources. Presentations of information are not likely to equip nonexpert participants to take an effective part in the proceedings, even in more elaborate educational efforts, such as the ASARCO case. Respondents to a survey typically have no preparation and respond in a virtual vacuum. Because their consent is necessary in an initiative or negotiation, participants are in a position of greater equality with government authorities. Parties attempting to influence the outcome will provide information and arguments to negotiators or voters. In a negotiation, participants have substantial influence over the definition of issues and access to technical experts. Their consent is a condition for the successful conclusion of the process.
Each mechanism exhibits weaknesses as well as strengths. Negotiated rule making promotes collective problem solving and sharing of information, but at the national level is unlikely to achieve direct participation by amateurs. A hearing is an open forum, with minimal preparation, but may force participants into a reactive, oppositional role. The dominance of the hearing process by organized interests can bias policymakers' perceptions of public concerns. A survey is more representative and can measure intensity of views, but takes opinions out of context, with no opportunity for discussion. An initiative delegates authority to citizens and may stimulate discussion and a search for information, but forces a majority decision.
The more common mechanisms for citizen participation fare poorly under the democratic process criteria. Hearings exhibit a number of weaknesses, especially for issues as dynamic and complex as those in environmental policymaking. Surveys are even less appealing from a democratic process perspective. They fail to enlarge upon the public's understanding and remove citizens from the effects of their influence. Citizens review panels permit direct participation by amateurs, but cannot claim to be representative of the affected public and reach a small number of people.
Implications and Directions
This review suggests several directions for practice and research. One would be to complement one mechanism with another. A survey could provide a mechanism for "social mapping" (Roberts et al. 1984 ) to clarify the bases of disagreement on issues in preparation for a negotiation or a series of public hearings. A series of citizen review panels could add balance and depth to what policymakers are likely to hear in open public hearings. Any one mechanism can also be modified to account for its deficiencies. Barber's (1984) proposal for a national initiative incorporates a multichoice format allowing voters to express intensity and other nuances of views on issues. He recommends a two-or three-stage voting procedure that would require voters to reaffirm decisions after a six-month reading period, as a "built-in check on public mercurialness" (p. 284). Because people are more likely to seek information on salient issues, the obligation to establish a position for a vote could stimulate learning and discussion.
A principal research need is for institutional policy analysis that relates participatory mechanisms to different kinds of technological policy problems. There is a difference between the issues that can be presented to the public in a municipal or state-wide initiative and those that can be addressed through a regulatory negotiation or citizens review panel. One may be suited better to seeking community guidance on the need for more stringent controls on medical wastes, another to asking representatives of the public to weigh the results of a risk assessment and advise on the need for regulatory controls.
Even the public hearing, despite its pervasiveness, has received little empirical analysis. For many purposes, a hearing may be appropriate. But there are issues in which face-to-face contact and the motivations for participation may further polarize positions, increase conflict, and obstruct the search for common ground and shared values.4 Hearings offer an especially rich opportunity for research, because they are so common, are a matter of public record, and the participation and proceedings typically are welldocumented. A result could be research-based, prescriptive guidelines that would tell us not only how to hold a public meeting, but when. Such research exists on negotiation, and agencies have found it useful for designing negotiation processes and selecting rules.
Another useful direction would be the use of participatory mechanisms to engage citizens in deliberation about decision models underlying policy decisions. Shrader-Frechette (1985, 210) proposes a scheme for weighting decision models to account for the lay public's emphasis on low-probability events with catastrophic potential. Participation could inform policymakers on such generic issues as how to weigh sources of uncertainty in risk assessments, how to compare risks that are distributed broadly to those that are concentrated and socially disruptive, or how to balance scientific uncertainty against the magnitude or irreversibility of health or ecological effects. The objective should be to inform our models through mechanisms that rank high under the democratic process criteria-by informing judgment as well as measuring preferences, by not isolating issues from group or community influences, and by engaging people in the reasoning and discussion that defines their role as citizens.
Normative and Other Criteria
The emphasis here has been on normative grounds for assessing participatory mechanisms, in the form of the democratic process criteria, principally because they are often overlooked in the literature on participation. Assessments under instrumental and substantive criteria are also important. Among these criteria are capacities for clarifying the factual basis of disputes, for achieving consensus, for improving acceptance of and compliance with decisions, for increasing public support for agencies and their programs, or for educating the public on the sources of environmental risk and the trade offs of policy options. We could also assess participatory mechanisms by their capacities for drawing a broader range of views into decisions or for reducing the likelihood of policy errors. It is also necessary to consider a number of practical issues. Cost is one such issue; another is the typical lack of incentives for lay participation in decision making. To the extent that practical incentives to encourage participation are missing, or that agencies consider the administrative costs unacceptable, then institutional development and experimentation are unlikely.
Yet the case for participation should begin with a normative argumentthat a purely technocratic orientation is incompatible with democratic ideals. The democratic process criteria outlined here offer a basis for assessing institutional mechanisms in normative terms. These democratic criteria project a vision of citizenship that can help to place the more obvious practical difficulties in perspective. Their lesson is that if administrative institutions and processes do not reflect the ideals of a democratic society, then we may want to rethink their acceptability on analytical or efficiency grounds alone.
